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THE COURT
"In Steps Big and Small, Supreme
Court Moved Right"
The New York Times
July 1, 2007
Linda Greenhouse
It was the Supreme Court that conservatives
had long yearned for and that liberals feared.
By the time the Roberts court ended its first
full term on Thursday, the picture was clear.
This was a more conservative court,
sometimes muscularly so, sometimes more
tentatively, its majority sometimes differing
on methodology but agreeing on the outcome
in cases big and small.
As a result, the court upheld a federal anti-
abortion law, cut back on the free-speech
rights of public school students, strictly
enforced procedural requirements for bringihg
and appealing cases, and limited school
districts' ability to use racially conscious
measures to achieve or preserve integration.
With the exception of four death penalty cases
from Texas, where the state and federal courts
remain to the right of the Supreme Court and
produce decisions that the justices regularly
overturn, the prosecution prevailed in nearly
every criminal case, 14 of the 18 non-Texas
cases.
Fully a third of the court's decisions, more
than in any recent term, were decided by 5-to-
4 margins. Most of those, 19 of 24, were
decided along ideological lines,
demonstrating the court's polarization
whether on constitutional fundamentals or
obscure questions of appellate procedure. The
court's last-minute decision, announced on
Friday, to hear appeals from Guantanamo
detainees required votes from at least five of
the nine justices.
Of the ideological cases decided this term, the
conservative majority, led by Chief Justice
John G. Roberts Jr. and joined by Justices
Antonin Scalia, Clarence Thomas and Samuel
A. Alito Jr., prevailed in 13. The court's
increasingly marginalized liberals-Justices
John Paul Stevens, David H. Souter, Ruth
Bader Ginsburg and Stephen G. Breyer-
prevailed in only six, including the four Texas
death penalty cases.
The difference depended on how Justice
Anthony M. Kennedy voted. Remarkably, he
was in the majority in all 24 of the 5-to-4
cases. In the 68 cases the court decided by
signed opinions, Justice Kennedy dissented
only twice.
The statistics underscore what case after case
demonstrated as the term unfolded: Justice
Kennedy's role in the position that Justice
Sandra Day O'Connor once held at the court's
center of gravity. "Kennedy is very much the
median justice now, as Justice O'Connor was,
and he is to her right," said Steven G.
Calabresi, a professor at Northwestern
University School of Law.
Professor Calabresi, a former law clerk to
Justice Scalia and a founder of the Federalist
Society, added: "Clearly the court has moved
in a direction that leaves most conservatives
pleased."
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Justice O'Connor's actual replacement,
Justice Alito, who took his seat in January
2006 and who thus has just completed his first
full term, is indisputably to Justice
O'Connor's right. His vote in place of hers
made the difference in several important
cases, including the decision to uphold the
federal Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act and to
treat campaign advertising by corporations
and unions as core political speech despite the
restrictions imposed by the McCain-Feingold
campaign finance law. Justice O'Connor
would most likely have voted to uphold the
Seattle and Louisville, Ky., school integration
plans that the court, with Justice Alito in the
majority, voted on Thursday to invalidate; she
was the author of the court's opinion in 2003
to uphold the affirmative action admissions
plan at the University of Michigan law
school.
It was that decision that prompted Justice
Breyer's highly unusual declaration from the
bench on Thursday: "It is not often in the law
that so few have so quickly changed so
much."
Conservative commentators, in discussing the
court term, appeared to take pains not to
gloat, tending to emphasize that a number of
the decisions moved the law by increments
rather than leaps or came in cases that were
"pre-ordained to showcase the court's
conservative leanings." as Professor Richard
W. Garnett of Notre Dame Law School put it.
"The marquee cases this term happened to
reflect the culture war issues where
Kennedy's leanings are to the right." he said.
But liberals were in an unrestrained "we told
you so" mode. "This court has shown the
same respect for precedent that a wrecking
ball shows for a plate-glass window," said
Ralph G. Neas, president of People for the
American Way, which helped lead the effort
to defeat the nominations of both Chief
Justice Roberts and Justice Alito. Emily
Bazelon, a liberal commentator on legal
subjects for the online journal Slate, posted a
column on Friday entitled, "Sorry Now?"
The question of how the court is treating its
precedents is one that recurred throughout the
term in various justices' opinions. The court
explicitly overturned only three precedents,
two obscure cases from the 1960s that
permitted excuses for missing court filing
deadlines and a foundational antitrust decision
from 1911 that prohibited manufacturers from
imposing minimum retail prices.
Other precedents were left standing, at least
for the time being, by decisions that avoided
direct overrulings while providing a roadmap
for future challenges. In several cases, a
frustrated Justice Scalia prodded Chief Justice
Roberts to move further and faster to overturn
precedents that both men clearly dislike.
Their differences in style, while apparent, did
not extend to difference in substance; in
nonunanimous cases, the two were in
agreement 89 percent of the time, according
to statistics compiled by ScotusBlog.
One theme was the court's sustained interest,
across many areas of legal doctrine, in
limiting the ability of plaintiffs to bring or
appeal lawsuits. The trend was so pronounced
that Professor Judith Resnik of Yale Law
School proposed as a label for the term: "the
year they closed the courts."
Not all the access-limiting decisions were
closely divided. In two important securities
cases, the court placed new limits on
shareholder lawsuits by votes of 8 to 1 and 7
to 1. Many cases on the court's fast-growing
business docket were decided by comfortable
margins. "The entire Supreme Court has a
mistrust of lawyer-driven litigation," Roy T.
Englert Jr., who has argued many business
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cases at the court, told a forum at the
Washington Legal Foundation this week.
The court's overall approach to business cases
left many in the business community gleeful.
"It's our best Supreme Court term ever," said
Robin S. Conrad, executive vice president of
the National Chamber Litigation Center,
which handles Supreme Court cases for the
United States Chamber of Commerce.
The 68 cases the court decided during the
term that began last Oct. 2 and ended June 28
were the fewest since the 65 cases the court
decided in 1953. That was in an era when the
court received barely one-quarter of the 8,000
petitions it now gets every year. The court
was deciding more than 100 cases a term as
recently as the early 1990s. The justices are
self-conscious about the low number and the
resulting gaps in their argument schedule. But
they seem unable to find a sustained flow of
cases that four justices, the required number,
are willing to vote to hear.
But the court's move on Friday to add the
Guantanamo case to its calendar came as a
surprise. In its term that begins on Oct. 1, the
court will hear challenges by two groups of
Guantanamo detainees to the legislation
barring their access to federal court. A
Supreme Court that divided 5 to 4 this month
on whether a prisoner should get three extra
days to file an ordinary notice of appeal will
have its work cut out as it confronts a clash of
historic dimension between presidential
power and individual rights.
Here are summaries of the term's major
decisions.
Equal Protection
By a vote of 5 to 4, the court invalidated
voluntary integration plans in the school
districts of Seattle and metropolitan
Louisville, Ky., ruling that using a student's
race to govern the availability of a place at a
desired school. even for the purpose of
preventing resegregation, violated the 14th
Amendment's guarantee of equal protection.
Chief Justice Roberts wrote the opinion in
Parents Involved in Community Schools v.
Seattle School District No. 1, No. 05-908. But
Justice Kennedy, a member of the majority,
refused to sign the more far-reaching parts of
the chief justice's opinion that would have
barred even more general considerations of
race. His position in the middle of the court
gave small comfort to the four dissenters,
Justices Stevens, Breyer, Souter and
Ginsburg.
Business
A pair of decisions made it more difficult for
investors to sue companies, executives and
underwriters when they suspect securities
fraud or unlawful manipulation. In Tellabs
Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights Ltd., No. 06-
484, the court ruled 8 to 1 that shareholders
must show "cogent and compelling evidence"
of intent to defraud in order to withstand
dismissal of their lawsuit. Justice Ginsburg
wrote the opinion, and Justice Stevens
dissented.
In the second case, the court voted 7 to 1 to
dismiss a shareholders' antitrust suit that
accused 10 leading investment banks of
conspiring to fix the prices and terms for
initial public offerings. The court held that the
challenged behavior fell within the regulatory
domain of the Securities and Exchange
Commission, making the banks generally
immune from antitrust liability. Justice Breyer
wrote the opinion in the case, Credit Suisse
Securities v. Billing, No. 05-1157, and Justice
Thomas dissented. Justice Kennedy did not
participate.
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In its most important patent ruling in years,
the court tilted away from patent owners and
made it easier to find that a patent had been
improperly issued for an invention that was
"obvious" and therefore undeserving of patent
protection. Justice Kennedy wrote the
unanimous opinion in the case, KSR
International Co. v. Teleflex Inc., No. 04-
1350.
In an important antitrust ruling, the court
voted 5 to 4 to overturn a 96-year-old
precedent under which it was always illegal
for a manufacturer and retailer to agree on
minimum resale prices. The legality of price
maintenance will now be judged case by case
for its impact on competition. Justice
Kennedy wrote the opinion in Leegin
Creative Leather Products Inc. v. PSKS Inc.,
No. 06-480. The dissenters were Justices
Breyer, Stevens, Souter and Ginsburg.
The justices continued to curb punitive
damages in a 5-to-4 decision that overturned a
$79.5 million award against Philip Morris.
Justice Breyer's majority opinion in Philip
Morris USA v. Williams, No. 05-1256, held
that the Oregon jury that gave the award to
the widow of a lifelong smoker might have
improperly calculated the figure to punish the
cigarette maker for harm to other smokers as
well.
The dissenters were Justices Scalia, Thomas,
Ginsburg and Stevens.
Criminal Law
In Rita v. United States, No. 06-5754, the
court held by a vote of 8 to 1 that even though
the federal sentencing guidelines are no
longer mandatory, a sentence within the
guidelines range can be presumed on appeal
to be "reasonable." In federal circuits that
adopt such a presumption, it will be more
difficult for defendants to challenge sentences
that follow the guidelines. Justice Breyer
wrote the majority opinion, and Justice Souter
dissented.
The court continued to interpret and apply the
law Congress passed in 1996, the
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty
Act, to restrict the jurisdiction of the federal
courts to rule on habeas corpus petitions from
state prison inmates. The justices ruled, 9 to 0,
that the federal appeals court in California had
overstepped those limits when it granted a
new trial to a convicted murderer on the
ground that the jury had been prejudiced
against him by seeing the victim's relatives in
the courtroom wearing buttons with the
victim's picture on them.
Without deciding whether the buttons had, in
fact, caused prejudice, Justice Thomas wrote
for the court that under the 1996 law, a
federal court could not base a grant of habeas
corpus on a legal principle that the Supreme
Court itself had not adopted. The case was
Carey v. Musladin, No. 05-785.
The court ruled, 8 to 1, that the police did not
violate a speeding driver's rights by ramming
his car and causing a devastating accident.
The police officers' decision to force the
driver off the road after a high-speech chase
was reasonable, Justice Scalia said in the
majority opinion. Justice Stevens dissented,
noting that the 19-year-old driver was
suspected of nothing more serious than
speeding. The case was Scott v. Harris, No.
05-1631.
A unanimous ruling extended to automobile
passengers the same right that drivers have to
challenge the validity of a decision by the
police to stop the car. Passengers in a car
stopped by the police do not feel free to walk
away, the court held in an opinion by Justice
Souter, and thus are "seized" for purposes of
the Fourth Amendment's prohibition of
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unreasonable seizure. The case was Brendlin
v. California, No. 06-8120.
The court made it easier for prosecutors in
death penalty cases to remove potential jurors
who express ambivalence about the death
penalty. Writing for the 5-to-4 majority,
Justice Kennedy said appeals courts must
defer to a trial judge's decision on whether a
potential juror would be able to overcome
qualms about capital punishment and be open
to voting to impose a death sentence. The
dissenters, in an opinion by Justice Stevens
that Justices Souter, Ginsburg and Breyer also
joined, said this set the disqualification bar
too low and would skew juries toward those
most likely to vote for death. The case was
Uttecht v. Brown, No. 06-413.
The court ruled 5 to 4 that a mentally ill
convicted murderer who was delusional and
lacked a "rational understanding" of why the
state had sentenced him to death could not be
executed. Justice Kennedy wrote the opinion
in Panetti v. Quarterman, No. 06-6407. The
dissenters were Chief Justice Roberts and
Justices Scalia, Thomas and Alito.
Abortion
The court upheld the federal Partial-Birth
Abortion Ban Act in a 5-to-4 decision that
was a reversal of course and a refr-aming of
the abortion issue. The decision in Gonzales
v. Carhart, No. 05-380, was the first time the
court had upheld a prohibition on a specific
method of abortion. The law, enacted in 2003,
subjects doctors to fines and prison terms.
In 2000, with Justice O'Connor in the
majority, the court had voted 5 to 4 to strike
down a nearly identical state ban, from
Nebraska. Justice Kennedy's majority opinion
emphasized abortion's "ethical and moral
concerns" and said the law protected women
who might otherwise have an abortion by the
prohibited method from "regret," "grief' and
"sorrow."
Justices Ginsburg, Stevens, Souter and Breyer
dissented.
Access to Court
A deadline for filing a federal appeal could
not be excused by the fact that a federal judge
had given an inmate's lawyer the wrong date,
the court held in a 5 to 4 opinion by Justice
Thomas. The decision, Bowles v. Russell, No.
06-5306, overturned two precedents from the
1960s that had endorsed a "unique
circumstances" excuse for missed deadlines.
Justices Souter, Stevens, Ginsburg and Breyer
dissented.
The court rejected a longstanding position of
the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission, which the Bush administration
had repudiated months earlier, on the deadline
for filing a pay discrimination case. The
federal statute against employment
discrimination requires an employee, as a
condition of being able to proceed with a
lawsuit, to file a formal complaint within 180
days of the discriminatory act.
Under the commission's doctrine of
"paycheck accrual." that 180-day clock resets
every time the employee receives a paycheck
with pay lower than it would have been in the
absence of discrimination. But the court's 5-
to-4 decision in Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire
and Rubber Company, No. 05-1074, requires
the employee to have filed within 180 days of
the act of discrimination, an interpretation that
will keep many such cases out of court.
Justices Ginsburg, Stevens, Souter, and
Breyer dissented.
The court ruled 5 to 4 that taxpayers did not
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have standing to challenge the Bush
administration's expenditure of federal money
to support its Office of Faith-Based and
Community Initiatives. The dissenters in the
decision, Hein v. Freedom From Religion
Foundation, No. 06-157, were Justices
Souter, Stevens, Ginsburg and Breyer.
In an important disability case, the court ruled
that parents of children with disabilities could
go to court without a lawyer to challenge a
public school district's plan for their child's
education. Justice Kennedy's 7-to-2 opinion
said that a federal statute, the Individuals with
Disabilities Education Act, which guarantees
a "free, appropriate public education" to all
children, gives rights to parents as well.
Justices Scalia and Thomas dissented from
the decision, Winkelman v. Parma City
School District, No. 05-983.
Speech
The court ruled 5 to 4 that the restriction on
corporate- and union-sponsored television
advertising, contained in the 2002 McCain-
Feingold campaign finance law, threatened to
curb core political speech. The provision
could be constitutional, Chief Justice Roberts
said, only if interpreted narrowly to apply
only to advertisements that are "susceptible of
no reasonable interpretation other than as an
appeal to vote for or against a specific
candidate."
The dissenters, Justices Souter. Stevens,
Ginsburg and Breyer, said the ruling would
open the door to a flood of corporate and
union money in the guise of the "sham" issue
advertisements that the law was designed to
stop. They said the opinion, Federal Election
Commission v. Wisconsin Right to Life, No.
06-969, effectively overruled a major part of
the law as well as the 2003 Supreme Court
decision that had upheld it, a view with which
many election law experts agreed.
School officials can censor and punish student
speech that can be interpreted as advocating
or celebrating the use of illegal drugs, the
court held in ruling that a principal did not
violate a student's First Amendment rights by
suspending him for his display of a banner
proclaiming "Bong Hits 4 Jesus." Five
justices, in an opinion by Chief Justice
Roberts, found no constitutional violation; a
sixth, Justice Breyer, said the principal was
entitled to immunity from damages no matter
how the First Amendment question should be
answered. Justices Stevens, Souter and
Ginsburg dissented on First Amendment
grounds. The case was Morse v. Frederick,
No. 06-278.
Federal Authority
In its first encounter with global climate
change, the court ruled by a 5-to-4 vote that
the Environmental Protection Agency had the
authority to regulate heat-trapping gases in
automobile emissions. The agency had
maintained that it had no such authority and
that it would not use it if it did. But the court
said the agency could refuse to act only if it
provided a scientific basis for its refusal.
To reach that conclusion, the court first had to
find that Massachusetts, which along with
other states had brought the lawsuit against
the E.P.A., was suffering the type of injury
from the agency's antiregulatory stance that
gave the state standing to sue. Writing for the
majority, Justice Stevens said states were due
special deference in their claims to standing.
The case, Massachusetts v. Environmental
Protection Agency, No. 05-1120. marked a
rare expansion by the court of the doctrine of
standinu. Chief Justice Roberts dissented,
along with Justices Scalia. Thomas and Alito.
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"Roberts Steers Court Right
Back to Reagan"
USA Today
June 29, 2007
Joan Bisk-upic
In a remarkable first full term of the remade
Supreme Court, a narrow majority of
justices changed the law on race, abortion,
free speech and a swath of other issues
affecting American life.
Long-standing precedents were discarded or
reinterpreted. Government interests
prevailed over individual rights. Business
won at the expense of consumers and
workers. And people on the fringe, such as
rabble-rousing students and atheists, lost
out.
In the 2006-07 annual term that ended
Thursday, Chief Justice John Roberts, joined
by Antonin Scalia, Anthony Kennedy,
Clarence Thomas and newest justice Samuel
Alito, set the tone. Of 19 cases that broke
5-4 along ideological lines, that quintet
prevailed in 13 of them.
The conservative majority drew increasingly
heated protests from liberal Justices John
Paul Stevens, David Souter, Ruth Bader
Ginsburg and Stephen Breyer.
No case revealed the chasm between the
conservatives and the liberals as much as
Thursday's decision preventing the use of
race in school assignments. The dueling
written opinions ran for 178 pages, and the
ceremonial reading of the opinion highlights
went on for nearly an hour in the white
marble and red velvet courtroom.
"It is not often in the law that so few
have so quickly changed so much." Breyer
said.
Undoing Past Decisions
Roberts, fulfilling the conservatism inspired
by his personal hero, Ronald Reagan, is
taking command of the bench in a way that
eluded his predecessor, the late William
Rehnquist.
The Roberts court showed a distinct
willingness to confront past court rulings as
it:
* Struck down programs in Louisville and
Seattle that used students' race as a factor in
school placement to build diversity across a
district. The majority narrowly interpreted
the breadth of a 2003 case endorsing the use
of race in higher education admissions for
campus diversity.
*Upheld an unconditional ban on a midterm
abortion procedure that Congress called
"
4partial birth." The decision abandoned the
view of a 2000 case that such a ban was
unconstitutional without an exception for
when a physician believes it's best for the
mother's health.
*Diluted a portion of U.S. campaign-finance
law that barred corporations and labor
unions from running broadcast ads
mentioning candidates right before an
election. A 2003 court decision had broadly
upheld the ban.
* Limited the reach of a 1969 case that said
students do not "shed their constitutional
rights . . at the schoolhouse gate," by
allowing principals and teachers to
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discipline students for messages that
undercut anti-drug policies.
The same five-justice majority on Thursday
overturned a 1911 ruling that barred
manufacturers from setting minimum retail
prices for their goods.
"The court this term addressed issues that
many people care about," says Harvard
University law professor Richard Fallon.
"The fact that the Roberts Court could do so
much in its first term makes it more likely
that it will continue this way."
Fallon adds that this more conservative court
"is taking us backwards and aggressively
changing the law."
Notre Dame Law School professor Richard
Garnett, a former law clerk to Rehnquist
who thinks the court is moving in the right
direction, describes the shift in less dramatic
terms. "I don't see it as a counterrevolution.
I think it is more modest. They are refusing
to extend precedents with which they have
problems."
While legal analysts disagree about the
extent of the shift to the right, there is no
disputing that the liberals on the court are
voicing more frustration, and even moral
outrage, than occurred during Rehnquist's
stewardship.
"It is intolerable for the judicial system to
treat people this way, and there is not even a
technical justification for condoning this bait
and switch," Souter wrote for the dissenting
foursome as the majority spurned an appeal
by an Ohio defendant who missed a filing
deadline by days because a federal judge
gave him inaccurate information.
To Thursday's ruling rejecting Seattle and
Louisville area efforts to ensure racial
integration, Stevens said it was "cruel irony"
that Roberts would invoke the court's
decision against segregated schools in
Brown v. Board of Education. "It is my firm
conviction that no member of the court that I
joined in 1975 would have agreed with
today's decision," Stevens said.
The transformed court is a significant
achievement and likely enduring legacy for
President Bush. His first appointee, Roberts,
52, took the helm from William Rehnquist
in fall of 2005.
Rehnquist, who was named by Richard
Nixon in 1972 and elevated to chief in 1986
by Reagan, presided over a court whose
conservatism was revealed most consistently
in decisions on government structure and
that favored the states in disputes with
Washington.
Rehnquist was never able, despite his own
strong views, to prevail on many high-
profile social policy dilemmas. In fact, he
dissented when the majority struck down the
"partial birth" abortion ban in 2000 and
when it upheld campus affirmative action
and campaign-finance law in 2003.
The turnabout under Roberts is more
directly traced to Bush's replacement of
retired Justice Sandra Day O'Connor with
Alito, 57, in January 2006.
O'Connor, a 1981 Reagan appointee
who moved to the left with time, was the
key vote to strike down the state abortion
ban, endorse race in college admissions for
diversity and uphold the campaign finance
law known as McCain-Feingold for its
Senate sponsors.
"What a difference a single justice makes,"
says Goodwin Liu, a law professor at the
University of California, Berkeley. Alito
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also offered a check in some cases on how
far the conservative bloc went. When the
majority carved out an exception to speech
rights in a decision against a student with a
"Bong Hits 4 Jesus" banner. Alito wrote a
separate opinion offering a word of caution.
He said he was joining the decision on the
understanding that it only targeted messages
related to illegal drugs and not speech on
any political or social issue.
The Reagan Factor
In his 1980 presidential campaign and after
winning office, Ronald Reagan emphasized
what he believed were the excesses of the
judiciary in the wake of the Earl Warren era
and liberal intervention in social policy that
is usually the domain of elected officials.
Reagan set the bench on a conservative path
with his choices for the Supreme Court and
lower federal courts during two terms.
Roberts was with him in the beginning. He
joined the administration in 1981. saying he
was moved by Reagan's inaugural speech.
"I felt he was speaking to me."
As a lawyer for Reagan and then later in the
first Bush administration, Roberts often
asserted that judges were improperly
creating rights not in the Constitution. He
took a narrow view of abortion rights and
was involved in efforts to curtail affirmative
action, school busing and other programs
intended to bring minorities into settings
where they were once shut out.
Roberts' opposition to race-based programs
to spur integration was loud and clear in
Thursday's ruling. "The way to stop
discrimination on the basis of race is to stop
discriminating on the basis of race," he
wrote, seeking to end all programs that take
account of race.
Kennedy objected to that statement, so
Roberts fell one vote short of a majority for
that hard-line stance. But in the view of
dissenting justices and other critics of the
push to the right, Roberts has carried out a
new vision for the court.
"Yesterday, the citizens of this nation could
look for guidance to this court . . .
concerning desegregation," Breyer said.
"Today, they cannot."
Looking to the breadth of the term, Fallon
says, "It takes a long time to remake the
Supreme Court. Now we're seeing the court
in the image Ronald Reagan dreamed of. It
is sort of poetic that Chief Justice Roberts is
someone who long ago was inspired by
Reagan."
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"Newest Justice Tips High Court to Right"
The Washington Post
June 28, 2007
Robert Barnes
On a Supreme Court that has moved
consistently to the right, no justice has been
more important to the shift than the newest
one: Samuel A. Alito Jr.
The solidly conservative Alito's replacement
of the more moderate Sandra Day O'Connor
has made the difference in two of this term's
biggest decisions-the vote in April to
uphold the federal Partial Birth Abortion
Ban Act and its ruling on Monday to
substantially weaken the McCain-Feingold
campaign finance act.
And Alito's vote will be key today if the
court announces what could be a landmark
decision about whether public school
districts may consider an individual
student's race when making assignments to
achieve diverse school populations.
"There's no question that Justice Alito is
more conservative than Justice O'Connor;
there's no question that his replacement of
Justice O'Connor moves the court to the
right," Washington lawyer Roy T. Englert, a
frequent Supreme Court practitioner, said
yesterday during a forum at the Washington
Legal Foundation.
"The president accomplished what he
wanted to do when he appointed Justice
Alito to the court."
But if Alito's consistency has provided the
outcomes his advocates hoped for and his
detractors feared, his low-key style has not
exactly been what was predicted in his
bruising confirmation battles.
The appeals court judge from New Jersey
was tagged with the demeaning nickname
"Scalito," a reference to the belief he would
be an acolyte of Justice Antonin Scalia. The
genial Chief Justice John G. Roberts Jr.,
thought by some Democrats to be more
moderate, sailed through his confirmation
hearings and received 78 votes in the
Senate; only four months later, 20 fewer
senators supported Alito.
But in Alito's first full year on the court-
not always the most accurate predictor of a
justice's future-he and Roberts have been
virtually interchangeable. The two have
been in full agreement in nearly 90 percent
of the court's cases this year, according to
statistics produced by the Washington law
firm Akin Gump Strauss Hauer & Feld.
Alito's votes have provided for "a
completely uniform step to the right" for the
court, said Akin Gump's Thomas C.
Goldstein. But he added that there is a "big
difference" in style between Alito and
Roberts and their brethren on the right,
Scalia and Clarence Thomas.
"Justice Alito, I think, is a very measured
conservative, not in the mold of someone
who wants to dramatically rewrite doctrine
in the manner that Justice Thomas and
Justice Scalia are very comfortable and
enthusiastic about."
Alito and Roberts supported each other this
week in 5 to 4 decisions that stopped short
of what the other conservatives wanted. In
the campaign finance decision, which
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divides the court-if not the public-along
ideological grounds, Scalia criticized Alito
for saying he would wait to see whether a
test proposed by Roberts to protect speech
rights worked before considering whether
the entire provision was unconstitutional, as
Scalia believed.
"The wait-and-see approach makes no
sense," Scalia wrote. "How will we know
that would-be speakers have been chilled
and have not spoken? If a tree does not fall
in the forest, can we hear the sound it would
have made had it fallen?"
Such criticism may not be entirely
unwelcome, as Alito and Roberts are being
criticized from the left for not living up to
their pledges to honor stare decisis-the idea
that previous rulings of the court should
usually stand.
Although the court has not explicitly
overturned specific precedents, Alito has
been part of the majority that has
implemented an unmistakable shift in the
court's holdings.
If a conservativ e majority rules against the
school programs in Seattle and Louisville,
Alito "will have been responsible for
overturning three of [O'Connor's] recent
landmark decisions," said Georgetown
University law professor Martin S.
Lederman. He was referring to her role as
the fifth vote to strike down a state's
prohibition of certain abortion procedures, to
find the campaign finance law constitutional
and to approve the use of race in admission
decisions to the University of Michigan-s
law school.
Because the views of Justice Anthony M.
Kennedy. the court's swing vote, were
already known in those cases, and because
Roberts's votes are no different flrom those
of the man he replaced, the late William H.
Rehnquist, it is Alito's support that has
changed the minority view to the majority
opinion.
Lederman has found 31 decisions from 1995
to 2005 in which O'Connor was in the 5 to 4
majority and in which there is a significant
chance Alito would vote differently.
Because of the increase in split decisions
this year, about double the number from last
term, Englert said that Alito's influence may
be misinterpreted.
"There is a tendency to take every 5-4
decision and say, 'Oh, this would have been
different if Justice O'Connor were still on
the court,"' he said. "Sometimes that's true,
and sometimes it isn't true."
On the bench, Alito, 57, is a frequent and
precise questioner, although not nearly as
loquacious as Roberts and Scalia on the
right or Justice Stephen G. Breyer on the
left. He is soft-spoken and sometimes comes
across as even shy. But the former
prosecutor accepts a large number of the
speaking requests he receives, often
lecturing at universities and appearing
before lawyers and other groups.
He has a somewhat deadpan delivery-he
told the National Italian American
Foundation in a recent speech that reporters
sometimes don't catch his jokes. He said he
should perhaps signal such statements with
the text-messaging shorthand he has learned
from his daughter, a student at Georgetown
University.
"JK, JK," he said, which means "just
kidding, just kidding."
The first major decision that Alito wrote this
term-a ruling that a lawsuit alleging pay
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discrimination had been filed too late under
terms of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964-has also been one of the court's most
controversial.
Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg called it a
"parsimonious" reading of the law and
called on Congress to act. The proposed
Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act, named after
the plaintiff in the case, was scheduled to be
marked up in a House committee yesterday.
Before the Italian American group, Alito
accepted praise from a questioner for the
decision but quickly noted that not everyone
agreed with it. Since he wasinterpreting the
law that Congress passed, Alito said, "it's
certainly Congress's prerogative" to
change it.
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"Courting Controversy"
Time
July 9, 2007
Jeffrey Rosen
Ever since Robert Bork was defeated in his
1987 bid for a seat on the Supreme Court,
liberals have feared that the court would turn
right on the issues they care most about.
And this was the year their fears finally
began to be vindicated. As the first full term
with both Justices John Roberts and Samuel
Alito came to a close, it became increasingly
clear that in the post-Sandra Day O'Connor
era, the center of the court has shifted
several degrees to the right. Both Alito and
Anthony Kennedy, who has emerged as the
new swing Justice, are more conservative
than O'Connor was on some key issues that
came before the Justices this term. As a
result, the court tacked right in decisions on
issues ranging from partial-birth abortion
and employment discrimination to, in recent
days, campaign finance.
Some observers believe that if the
Democrats win the presidency in 2008, the
clash between a more conservative Supreme
Court and a more liberal White House and
Congress might reach historic proportions.
"You could have significant conflict
between the court and the political branches,
one that we probably haven't seen since the
1930s," Samuel Issacharoff of the New
York University School of Law has
suggested. Yet throughout American history,
the President and Congress have gotten
angry at the court only when it frustrated the
will of a large national majority. In many
cases in which the Roberts Court is turning
right, it appears to have at least a narrow
majority of the country on its side.
Think about the issues in which the center of
the court, defined by Kennedy, is now more
conservative than it was with O'Connor.
The federal ban on partial-birth abortion?
Polls consistently show overwhelming
support for it. Affirmative action? After the
Supreme Court upheld the University of
Michigan Law School's affirmative-action
plan in 2003, Michigan voters repudiated it
in a referendum. "Any court on which
Justice Kennedy is the median voter will
never do anything to provoke dramatic
backlashes," says Michael Klarman of the
University of Virginia School of Law,
"because Justice Kennedy has his finger on
the pulse of Middle America even more than
Justice O'Connor did." In the last week of
the term, Kennedy joined 5-4 opinions
upholding the power of school principals to
discipline students and limiting challenges
to public funding of religion. Those aren't
likely to provoke a widespread rebellion.
If the court reversed Roe v. Wade or began
striking down environmental laws like the
Clean Air Act, national majorities might
well become energized and alarmed.
Although Justice Clarence Thomas has
signaled his willingness to overturn Roe and
gut the heart of the regulatory state.
Kennedy is unlikely to provide a fifth vote
for either. In the partial-birth case, he
repeated his longstanding view that although
late-term abortions could be restricted, the
early-term abortions at the core of Roe had
to be protected. And he made clear his
support for environmental regulations when
he joined the court's four liberals in holding
that the Bush Environmental Protection
Agency thwarted the will of Congress in
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refusing to regulate greenhouse gases.
If congressional Democrats want to pick a
fight with the court in the short term, in
hopes of prompting a leftward shift, they'll
have to be careful to choose issues in which
they can count on support from a significant
majority of the country. Rather than try to
repeal the popular ban on partial-birth
abortion-which many Democratic voters
support-they might try instead to protect
gender equality by overturning the court's
narrow interpretation of the federal law
prohibiting pay discrimination.
But to mount a successful challenge to the
court, Democrats not only need to have
public opinion behind them; they also have
to mobilize it effectively. During a handful
of periods in American history-like the
New Deal-congressional opposition to the
court was so intense that the court did an
about-face. More frequently, though,
opposition has been more diffuse, leading
the court to beat only a partial retreat or
ignore its critics. During the 1960s, for
example, Congress complained about the
Warren Court's school prayer and
apportionment decisions, but there was no
public outcry, and the court stood its ground.
Now that Congress has been recaptured by
the Democrats, liberals have an opportunity
to flex their muscles at the court. But as long
as the court moves only as far to the right as
a majority of the country will tolerate, its
critics will have an uphill battle.
To mount a successful challenge to the
court. Democrats not only need to have
public opinion behind them; they also have
to mobilize it effectively.
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"Five to Four"
The New Yorker
June 25, 2007
Jeffrey Toobin
As George W. Bush staggers toward the
conclusion of his second term, he can point
to at least one major and enduring project
that has gone according to plan: the
transformation of the Supreme Court. In the
next week or so, the justices will begin their
summer recess. The first full term in which
Chief Justice John G. Roberts, Jr., and
Justice Samuel A. Alito, Jr., have served
together will thus be completed, and the
changes on the Court, and their implications
for the nation, have been profound.
The careers of Roberts and Alito have been
emblematic of the conservative ascendancy
in American law. Both men, shortly after
graduating from law school, joined the
Reagan Administration, where Edwin Meese
III, who was for a time the Attorney
General, and others were building a
comprehensive critique of the Supreme
Court under Chief Justices Earl Warren and
Warren E. Burger. The conservative agenda
has remained largely unchanged in the
decades since: Expand executive power. End
racial preferences intended to assist African-
Americans. Speed executions. Welcome
religion into the public sphere. And, above
all. reverse Roe v. Wade, and allow states to
ban abortion. As Alito wrote in an
application for a Justice Department
promotion in 1985. his work on abortion and
race cases, among other Reagan
Administration priorities, had given him the
chance "to advance legal positions in which
I personally believe very strongly."
Moving with great swiftness, by the stately
standards of the Court. Roberts. Alito, and
their allies have already made progress on
that agenda. In Alito's first major opinion as
a justice, earlier this year, he sharply
restricted the ability of victims of
employment discrimination to file lawsuits.
The Court said that plaintiffs in such cases
must bring their suits within a hundred and
eighty days of, say, an unfair raise. But,
because it generally takes employees longer
than that to establish that they have been
cheated, the effect of the ruling will be to
foreclose many lawsuits. In a similar vein,
the Court upheld a death sentence in
Washington by lessening the scrutiny
applied to jury selection in such cases. Last
week, the justices rejected an appeal by a
prisoner who had filed his case before a
deadline set by a federal district judge.
Because the judge had misread the law and
given the prisoner too much time-three
extra days-the Court said that the case had
to be thrown out.
Most notoriously. the Court, for the first
time in its history, upheld a categorical ban
on an abortion procedure. The case dealt
with so-called partial-birth abortion-a
procedure performed rarely, often when
there are extraordinary risks to the mother,
the fetus, or both. But more important than
the ruling were the implications of Justice
Anthony M. Kennedy's opinion. The Court
all but abandoned the reasoning of Roe v.
Wade (and its reaffirmation in the 1992
Cascy decision) and adopted instead the
assumptions and the rhetoric of the anti-
abortion movement. To the Court, it was the
partial-birth-abortion procedure, not the
risks posed to the women who seek it, that
was "laden with the power to devalue
human life." In the most startling passage in
78
the opinion. Kennedy wrote, "While we find
no reliable data to measure the phenomenon,
it seems unexceptionable to conclude some
women come to regret their choice to abort
the infant life they once created and
sustained." Small wonder that Kennedy's
search for such data was unavailing;
notwithstanding the claims of the anti-
abortion movement, no intellectually
respectable support exists for this
patronizing notion. The decision to have an
abortion is never a simple one, but until this
year the Court has said that the women
affected, not the state, had the last word.
All these conservative victories were
decided by votes of five to four, with
Kennedy joining Roberts, Alito, Antonin
Scalia, and Clarence Thomas to form the
majority. (The last big case outstanding this
term is a challenge to school-desegregation
plans in Louisville and Seattle. Based on the
oral argument, Kennedy appears likely to
join the same quartet in striking down the
plans.) Kennedy holds the balance of power
in the Roberts Court, much the way Sandra
Day O'Connor did in the Rehnquist years.
Kennedy is more conservative than
O'Connor, so the Court is, too. He sided
with the liberals in only one important case
this year, when the Court ruled that the
gases that cause global warming are
pollutants under the Clean Air Act. a ruling
that repudiated the Bush Administration's
narrow view of the law.
The Rehnquist Court had its share of divided
rulings, of course-most notably, Bush v.
Gore-but the new conservative ascendancy
has prompted a striking reaction fiom the
dissenting liberals, John Paul Stevens, David
Souter, Ruth Bader Ginsburg, and Stephen
Breyer. It has been the custom at the Court
for dissenters to explain their views
individually or in small groups; but this
group. led by Stev ens, the senior member of
the Court, has taken to uniting around a
single opinion, as if to emphasize a
collective view that the majority is taking
the law in dangerous directions. In the case
about the missed appeal deadline, the
dissenting opinion, by the usually mild-
mannered Souter (who was joined by
Stevens, Ginsburg, and Breyer), reflected
true anguish: "It is intolerable for the
judicial system to treat people this way, and
there is not even a technical justification for
condoning this bait and switch."
Ginsburg, who prides herself on her
collegiality, has taken to reading her
dissenting opinions aloud from the bench-a
vigorous protest in the genteel world of the
justices. In her dissent (also joined by the
others) in the abortion case, she observed
that in 2000 five justices rejected a Nebraska
ban on partial-birth abortions that was nearly
identical to the one the Court upheld this
year. O'Connor was still on the Court and in
the majority in the Nebraska case, so the
only meaningful difference between then
and now, as Ginsburg noted, is that the
Court is "differently composed than it was
when we last considered a restrictive
abortion regulation."
And that, ultimately, is the point. When it
comes to the incendiary political issues that
end up in the Supreme Court, what matters
is not the quality of the arguments but the
identity of the justices. Presidents pick
justices to extend their legacies; by this
standard, Bush chose wisely. The days when
justices surprised the Presidents who
appointed them are over-the last two
purported surprises, Souter and Kennedy,
were anything but. Souter's record pegged
him as a moderate; Kennedy was nominated
because the more conservative Robert Bork
was rejected by the Senate. All the
subsequently appointed justices-Thomas,
Ginsburg. Breyer, Roberts, and Alito-have
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turned out precisely as might have been
expected by the Presidents who appointed
them.
At this moment, the liberals face not only
jurisprudential but actuarial peril. Stevens is
eighty-seven and Ginsburg seventy-four;
Roberts, Thomas, and Alito are in their
fifties. The Court, no less than the
Presidency, will be on the ballot next
November, and a wise electorate will vote
accordingly.
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"The Bush Court"
The National Journal
July 7, 2007
William Schneider
Back in 1900, author Finley Peter Dunne
quoted Mr. Dooley, his fictional Irish
saloonkeeper, as saying, "The Supreme
Court follows the election returns."
That is certainly the case with the Supreme
Court term that just ended. "The Roberts
Court is a different Court because George
Bush won the last election and John Kerry
did not," legal analyst Jeffrey Toobin said.
"That is the beginning and end of the reason
why this is a much more conservative
Supreme Court than two years ago."
In several significant cases, a conservative
majority that included both Bush appointees
changed the Court's direction.
* In 2000, the old Court threw out a state
ban on late-term abortions by a 5-4 vote.
This year, the new Court upheld such a ban
by 5-4.
* In 2003, the old Court upheld the McCain-
Feingold campaign finance law by 5-4. Last
week, in a 5-4 vote, the new Court struck
down the section of that law restricting pre-
election issue advertising.
* In 2003, by 5-4, the old Court allowed the
use of race as a criterion for admission to
schools of higher education. Last week, by
5-4, the new Court struck down the use of
race as a criterion for placing students in
public schools.
On the old Court, three reliably conservative
justices-William Rehnquist, Antonin
Scalia, and Clarence Thomas-were
frequently joined by Anthony Kennedy, a
moderate conservative. Four reliable
liberals-Stephen Breyer, Ruth Bader
Ginsburg, David Souter, and John Paul
Stevens-were sometimes joined by Sandra
Day O'Connor. a swing vote.
On the new Court, Bush has replaced
Rehnquist with John Roberts, an even more
reliable conservative. He also replaced
O'Connor with Samuel Alito. a reliable
conservative. Alito's vote, along with that of
Kennedy, shifted the Court's majority to the
conservatives. The four liberal justices are
now almost always in the minority on close
votes.
In the view of Georgetown University law
professor Steven Goldblatt, "Justice Alito is
a much more predictable conservative vote
than Justice O'Connor would have been."
Even Kennedy, the current swing vote, has
become more predictably conservative.
According to The Washington Post, when
the Court split 5-4 along liberal-conservative
lines this term, Kennedy sided with the
liberal bloc six times and the conservative
bloc 13 times, including on the three cases
cited above.
When earlier presidents nominated justices,
ideology was often just one consideration
among many. President Reagan was
fulfilling a pledge to appoint a woman when
he named O'Connor in 1981. When the
Senate rejected Robert Bork in 1987 after a
bruising ideological fight, Reagan tapped a
moderate conservative, Kennedy, to avoid
another battle. In 1990, President George
H.W. Bush picked Souter, whose views
were largely unknown, because he, too,
81
wanted to avoid a fight with a Democratic
Senate.
According to Toobin, "Presidents didn't
used to run for office making promises
about the kind of justices they would
appoint. But President George W. Bush did,
and he has delivered on those promises by
transforming the Court in a short period of
time."
Was the Court an issue to voters? In 2004, a
Newsweek poll asked Americans how
important each of 11 issues would be in their
vote for president. The results, in order of
importance, were the economy, health care,
education, Iraq, terrorism, Social Security,
taxes, the deficit, foreign policy, the
environment, and-at the very bottom of the
list-the Supreme Court. Although the
Court was not a major issue for most voters,
it mattered a great deal to Bush's
conservative base, which has been protesting
"iudicial activism" for decades.
In 2008, the Court could be an issue for
more of the electorate. "The stakes in the
next presidential election are actually huge
because the only likely Court retirees are on
the left," said Thomas Goldstein, a Supreme
Court lawyer who writes for Scotusblog. "A
Republican president could really swing the
Supreme Court in a very conservative
direction, or a Democratic president could
hold the line against further movement to
the right."
So, yes, the Supreme Court did follow the
election returns during the Bush presidency.
After all, arguably, the 2000 election returns
followed the Supreme Court.
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"How Conservative Is this Court?"
National Review
July 5, 2007
Jonathan H. Adler
It was perhaps inevitable that Linda
Greenhouse of the New York Times would
proclaim the Supreme Court has become the
"Court that conservatives had long yearned
for and that liberals feared." The
replacement of Justice Sandra Day
O'Connor, a moderate and increasingly
inconsistent pragmatist justice, with
conservative minimalist Samuel Alito
ensured a modest change across many areas
of legal doctrine. Yet it is an exaggeration to
report a "steady and well-documented turn
to the right" during the 2006-07 term, as did
the Washington Post in an end-of-term.
review.
The replacement of Justice O'Connor with
Justice Alito has shifted the Supreme Court
slightly to the right, but there is no
conservative legal revolution in the offing. If
anything, the pattern of the Court's
decisions somewhat reflects Justice
Kennedy's somewhat conservative
jurisprudence-moderately conservative and
generally resistant to dramatic shifts in
established doctrine. On many issues,
Kennedy is in line with the minimalist
approach of the chief justice and Justice
Alito, yet on many others he is willing to be
significantly more aggressive and depart
from conservative principles. The swing
justice has a soft spot for sweeping moral
arguments, such as claims about personal
autonomy or the nature of deliberative
democracy.
Some feign surprise at the voting pattern of
the Court's two newest justices, Chief
Justice Roberts and Justice Alito. Yet both
justices have performed as advertised.
President Bush promised Supreme Court
nominations in the mold of Justices Scalia
and Thomas, and there was never much
doubt that Roberts and Alito would join the
conservative side of the court. They are both
"conservative minimalists"; they read legal
texts fairly but narrowly, resist the creation
or recognition of new legal rights, show
respect for precedent, and avoid announcing
legal rules broader than necessary to decide
a given case. If anything, some
conservatives may think President Bush
over-promised, as Roberts and Alito are
more reluctant to reverse prior cases than
either Scalia and Thomas. Indeed, Alito and
Roberts are less prone to overturn prior
precedent than any of their colleagues on the
Court.
The two newest justices have undoubtedly
had an impact, however. Both Bush
nominees bring powerful intellects and
strong principles to the Court. Chief Justice
Roberts has much in common with his
mentor, the late Chief Justice William
Rehnquist, but Justice Alito is both more
conservative and consistent than was Justice
O'Connor. Nonetheless, the change has been
anything but revolutionary. Most of the
Warren and Burger Court precedents that
most stoke conservative ire remain on the
books.
In many respects, this year saw the
emergence of the "Kennedy Court," with all
that implies. As the swing justice, Justice
Kennedy was able to dictate the outcome in
many cases. He voted with the majority in
every one of this term's 5-4 decisions, even
those that were not decided along
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ideological lines. But even when he did not
cast the deciding vote. Justice Kennedy was
almost always in the majority. The Court
decided 68 cases after oral argument this
term, and Justice Kennedy dissented only
twice, according to end-of-term statistics
compiled by the folks at SCOTUSBlog.
Chief Justice Roberts, by comparison,
dissented eight times, and Justice Alito ten,
whereas Justices Thomas and Souter each
had 16 dissents. Justice Stevens was the
most frequent dissenter, voting with the
minority 26 times.
This term's docket included many cases in
which Justice Kennedy joined the four more
conservative justices in many high profile
cases, but a single term does not produce a
representative sample. A different mix of
cases would likely produce quite different
results. On questions from sexual privacy to
capital punishment to executive authority in
the war on terror, Justice Kennedy often
joins the more liberal members of the Court.
On still other issues, including federal
preemption and state regulatory authority
over interstate commerce, the Court is
closely divided, but not on traditional
ideological lines.
Justice Kennedy is the least likely member
of the Court to uphold government
restrictions on speech. Thus, he joined
Justices Scalia and Thomas in urging the
Court to overturn portions of the Court's
2003 decision in McConnell v. FEC and
void federal limits on political advertising
adopted as part of the McCain-Feingold
campaign finance reforms, rejecting the
incremental approach adopted by Chief
Justice Roberts that would have preserved
the recent precedent. He also joined Justice
Alito's concurrence in the "Bong hits 4
Jesus" case, to ensure the Court's ruling
would not permit limits on political speech
by students.
If Roberts and Alito are consistent
minimalists, Justice Kennedy has a
"maximalist" streak. Kennedy joined Justice
Stevens' opinion for the Court in
Massachusetts v. EPA, effectively ordering
the Environmental Protection Agency to
regulate greenhouse gas emissions from
motor vehicles. This decision could have
profound implications, particularly for the
law of "standing." It invented a new doctrine
of "special solicitude" for state attorneys
general who wish to sue the federal
government. He also wrote the majority
opinion in Leegin Creative Leather Products
v. Psks, Inc., overturning a decades-old
antitrust precedent, and another in Panetti v.
Quarterman adopting an innovative and
expansive interpretation of federal law
allowing convicted criminal defendants to
file additional habeas corpus petitions.
Many commentators suggest that there was
an unusual level of rancor and division in
the Supreme Court this year. Simon Lazarus
complained of "an unprecedented avalanche
of 5-4 end-of-term Supreme Court
decisions," in The American Prospect and
the Washington Post editorialized that the
Court "seemed more fractured than ever.'"
Such claims, like the proclamations of a
conservative ascendancy, are overstated.
Only one-in-four decisions was unanimous,
and one-in-three was decided 5-4. This is
hardly an unprecedented level of division,
however. The level of unanimity was even
lower during the 2004-05 session. That term
the number of 5-4 decisions also reached 30
percent (as it did in the 2001-02 session). If
anything was unprecedented it was the
unusually high percentage of unanimous
rulings (45 percent). and low number of 5-4
decisions (13 percent) during Chief Justice
Roberts's first term that inflated
expectations. The 2005-06 unanimous
rulings in cases challenging abortion
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restrictions and the Solomon Amendment
were more unusual than the split decisions
of the term just past.
This is not to deny the very real doctrinal
divisions on the Court. The justices are
closely split on many issues, ranging from
criminal procedure and federalism to race
and the status of unenumerated rights.
SCOTUSBlog's analysis of the "rate of
dissension"-a measure of the number of
dissents per case-found the 2006-07 term
the most divided in recent years, barely
edging out the 2001-02 term, 1.82 dissents
per case to 1.81. This and other measures of
the Court's may be magnified by the Court's
ever-shrinking docket, however. Where once
the High Court heard 100 cases a term, the
justices only accepted 72 for 2006-07. As
the Court grants fewer cases, those that
remain on the docket may be more difficult,
contentious, and closely fought on the
margin. The oral statements from Justices
Ginsburg and Breyer delivering dissents in
high-profile cases may have been unusual,
but they were decidedly mild compared to
some of the fiery statements from prior
years, as when the Court handed down its
decisions in two abortion-related cases,
Stenberg v. Carhart and Colorado v. Hill.
Last Friday, after the term ended, the Court
agreed to hear another case concerning the
legal rights of Guantanamo Bay detainees in
the 2007-08 term. This was unusual because
it required the Court to reverse course,
granting rehearing of a petition the Court
had already denied earlier this year. This
means that at least five justices were willing
to hear the case-as opposed to the usual
four. It may also indicate that five justices
are skeptical of the Bush administration's
legal arguments. If so, this is another sign
that reports of a conservative judicial
revolution are a bit premature, and that this
remains a Court worth watching.
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"Fewer See Balance in Court's Decisions"
The Washington Post
July 29, 2007
Robert Barnes and Jon Cohen
About half of the public thinks the Supreme
Court is generally balanced in its decisions,
but a growing number of Americans say the
court has become "too conservative" in the
two years since President Bush began
nominating justices, according to a new
Washington Post-ABC News poll.
Nearly a third of the public-31 percent-
thinks the court is too far to the right, a
noticeable jump since the question was last
asked in July 2005. That's when Bush
nominated John G. Roberts Jr. to the court
and, in the six-month period that followed,
the Senate approved Roberts as chief justice
and confirmed Justice Samuel A. Alito Jr.
The two have proved to be reliably
conservative justices, and the increasingly
polarized court this year moved to uphold
restraints on abortion, restrict student speech
rights and limit the ability of school districts
to use race in student assignments, among
other issues.
The public seems to have noticed the shift.
The percentage who said the court is "too
conservative" grew from 19 percent to 31
percent in the past two years, while those
who said it is "generally balanced in its
decisions" declined from 55 percent to 47
percent.
"I think it shows that we re at a tipping point
in time," said Ralph G. Neas, president of
the liberal People for the American Way.
"And it's why a major priority for us over
the next 16 months will be to emphasize the
importance of the Supreme Court and why it
should be an important factor in voting for
president."
But conservative activists looking at the
political consequences of the past term say
the public is ambivalent about the two
rulings that have most marked the court's
turn to the right-upholding the ban on the
procedure sometimes called partial-birth
abortion and restricting the use of race in
school assignments.
The difference could lie in which side is
most successful in framing the court's
actions to a public that pays more attention
to the president and Congress.
"As a political strategist, I'd take those two
decisions any day of the week," said
Gregory R. Mueller, a public relations
consultant who has advised political
candidates and represents some conservative
judicial organizations. He said that racial
classifications remind Americans of quotas,
and that even the majority of the public that
thinks abortion should generally be available
favors some restrictions.
Liberals, on the other hand, portray the
court's decision to uphold the federal
Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act. passed by
Congress in 2003, as the first step toward
overruling Roe v. Wade and see the race
decision as a retreat from civil rights.
Both sides will find support for their views
in the Post-ABC poll results. which asked
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about the two key cases of the term.
Fifty-five percent of those polled-including
majorities of both women and men-
approved of the court's abortion ruling. The
decision significantly shifted the court's
abortion jurisprudence, marking the first
time justices have upheld a restriction on a
specific abortion procedure and one that
does not include an exception for a woman's
health.
But a majority disagreed with the court's
decision that sharply restricted the ability of
local school boards to use race when making
school assignments to achieve diverse
student bodies. Fifty-six percent of those
polled disapproved of the decision; 40
percent approved.
Three out of four blacks disapproved of the
court's ruling in the race case, as did a
narrow majority of whites. Seven out of 10
Democrats disagreed with the ruling, while
Republicans and independents both were
evenly split.
"People really don't want to go backwards
on civil rights," said Nan Aron, president of
the liberal Alliance for Justice, which
focuses on judicial nominations.
The increasing view of the court as more
conservative than liberal, and angry rhetoric
from Senate Democrats about the role of
Roberts and Alito in moving the court in that
direction, have energized liberal activist
groups that focus on the judiciary.
People for the American Way launched a
fundraising drive this month with an e-mail
missive sent to 400.000 activists; in the
message. Norman Lear, one of the group's
founders, warned, "Only you and I stand
between the new Supreme Court and the
continued chiseling away at the rights and
freedoms we Americans hold dear."
The group urges activists to sign online
petitions to "Correct the Court" by
legislatively overturning some of the court's
decisions.
But activists on the right have found in
recent years that their supporters are the
ones for whom changing the federal
judiciary has become a movement.
"It's a unifying issue in many ways for
Republicans," Mueller said. For the GOP,
nominating conservatives to the federal
judiciary, he added, "is one of those issues
that has almost become like anti-
communism was during the Cold War."
Mueller and his colleague Keith Appell
point to the presidential race, where, among
Republican candidates, former New York
mayor Rudolph W. Giuliani and former
Massachusetts governor Mitt Romney have
already named "justice advisory
committees" for counsel on issues and
nominations.
For Giuliani, a candidate seen in some
Republican circles as too moderate,
endorsements from conservative favorites
such as former solicitor general Theodore B.
Olson and Steven Calabresi, one of the
founders of the Federalist Society, a
conservative legal organization, were
important.
The specter of "liberal activist judges" is
still a strong rallying point for conservatives,
despite the fact that, because of the
Republican hold on the White House, seven
of the nine justices on the Supreme Court
were appointed by Republican presidents
and GOP appointees are in the majority on
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10 of the 13 U.S. courts of appeals.
Aron and Neas note that it was conservative
anger over court decisions that fueled the
right's interest in the federal courts, and they
hope that this term's decisions similarly
upset activists on the left. "Before, it was
hypothetical," Neas said.
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"Conservative Justice: Forget the Promises-Roberts
and Alito Delivered High Court Ideology"
Los Angeles Times
June 29, 2007
Erwin Chemerinsky
The Supreme Court term that ended
Thursday confirmed exactly what many
people had feared: that the testimony given
by John Roberts and Samuel Alito at their
confirmation hearings just months earlier
was a lot of baloney.
During those hearings, the two presented
themselves as open-minded jurists lacking
an ideological agenda. Roberts likened a
Supreme Court justice to an umpire, a
neutral arbiter whose personal political
views are irrelevant to decisions. Both
Roberts and Alito promised fidelity to the
court's precedents.
But instead, Chief Justice Roberts and
Justice Alito have behaved exactly as their
opponents predicted. There was not one case
this term in which the court was not
ideologically divided, and not one in which
Roberts and Alito did not vote for the result
that their conservative backers would have
wanted. In virtually all of these cases, they
were joined by justices Antonin Scalia,
Anthony Kennedy and Clarence Thomas.
The result was the most overwhelmingly
conservative term since the 1930s. Ever
since Richard Nixon ran for president in
1968, conservatives have been striving for a
reliable majority voting as a bloc across all
areas of the law-and this year they finally
got it.
Although Roberts and Alito did not
expressly vote to overrule precedents, they
chipped away at them in a series of niggling
decisions. For instance, they upheld a
federal law prohibiting so-called partial-
birth abortion-even though just seven years
ago, the Supreme Court struck down an
almost identical state law as a violation of
Roe vs. Wade. On Thursday, they ruled that
public schools cannot consider race to
achieve desegregation except under certain
limited conditions-even though three years
ago, the high court held that colleges and
universities have a compelling interest in
achieving diversity and may use race as a
factor in their admissions decisions.
A few years ago, the court upheld a
provision of the Bipartisan Campaign
Finance Reform Act that limited broadcast
advertisements by corporations and unions
with regard to specific candidates to 30 days
before primary elections or 60 days before a
general election. On Monday, the court did
not expressly overrule its earlier decision,
but it implicitly did so by adopting a
standard that will allow for virtually
unlimited advertising by corporations and
unions before elections.
At their confirmation hearings. both Roberts
and Alito presented themselves as
compassionate, insisting that they would not
ignore the needs and rights of the powerless.
Yet the decisions this term were especially
cruel, advancing the traditional conservative
preferences for the government over
criminal defendants and the interests of
business over consumers and employees. In
a particularly outrageous decision, the court
ruled, 5 to 4. that a criminal defendant was
barred from appealing when a federal
district court mistakenly gave him 17 days,
89
rather than 14, to file his appeal. Even
though the defendant followed the
instructions of the district court, the high
court held that he was barred because the
trial judge made a mistake.
In another case, the high court, again ruling
5 to 4, made it extremely difficult for
victims of pay discrimination to sue. The
court held that a claim must be brought
within 180 days of the time a person's pay is
set, even though it is rare that a person
would know of another employee's pay in
this time period and have the information
needed to be able to bring a discrimination
claim.
This term provides a powerful reminder of
the importance of presidential elections in
determining the composition of the court. If
John Kerry or Al Gore had picked the
replacements for William Rehnquist and
Sandra Day O'Connor, it would have been a
vastly different year at the Supreme Court.
It also is a reminder that the confirmation
process is not working. Nominees come
forward and murmur all the right platitudes,
refusing to answer specific questions about
their views. They promise to be open-
minded, and they present witnesses who
attest to their fairness. For Roberts and
Alito, this was enough to secure their
confirmation.
But now that they are on the bench, those
promises are forgotten. Roberts and Alito
are voting exactly as their fiercest critics
predicted, but nothing can be done about it
now. Both are under 60, and each could be
on the court another 30 years.
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JUSTICE KENNEDY'S ROLE
"The Fragile Kennedy Court"
The New York Times
July 7, 2006
The Supreme Court has nominally been the
Roberts Court since last fall, when John
Roberts arrived as chief justice. But as a
practical matter, the recently completed term
marked the start of the Kennedy Court. With
the departure of Sandra Day O'Connor,
Justice Anthony Kennedy cast the deciding
vote in case after case. The court's major
rulings, on presidential power,
environmental law and other issues,
reflected his moderately conservative, but
often fiercely independent, view of the law.
The two new justices, Chief Justice Roberts
and Justice Samuel Alito, produced little of
the term's excitement since both men
quickly fell into predictably conservative
voting patterns. Justice Alito voted with
Clarence Thomas 84 percent of the time in
non-unanimous decisions, and with John
Paul Stevens, a leader of the court's liberal
wing, just 13 percent. Chief Justice Roberts
agreed with Antonin Scalia fully 88 percent
of the time, and least often with Justice
Stevens.
With Chief Justice Roberts and Justices
Alito, Scalia and Thomas forming one bloc,
and the four most liberal justices forming
another, Justice Kennedy had the power to
make either camp's opinion the majority on
a striking number of cases.
His influence was clear in the most
important case of the term. the historic
ruling striking down the military tribunals at
the Guantanamo Bay detention camp.
Justice Kennedy provided the critical fifth
vote for Justice Stevens's impassioned
opinion that found fault not only with the
tribunals but with the Bush administration's
broader claims that the president has
inherent power to execute the war on terror
as he sees fit.
At other times, Justice Kennedy swung to
the right. In the Texas redistricting case, he
joined with the court's conservatives to
reject the claim that Republicans' redrawing
of the state's Congressional districts was so
nakedly partisan that it violated the
Constitution's equal protection clause. He
did, however, join the liberals in holding
that one of the newly created districts
violated the Voting Rights Act.
In a key environmental case, Justice
Kennedy came down between the
conservatives, who would have substantially
gutted the Clean Water Act's wetlands
protections, and the liberals, who would
have applied it forcefully. He laid out a
middle-of-the-road test that will, in the end,
most likely end up being fairly protective of
the environment.
There were cases, of course, that Justice
Kennedy did not decide. In an important
campaign finance case, the court struck
down a Vermont law but made clear that, as
a general matter, contribution limits were
constitutional. Justice Kennedy wrote his
own opinion that expressed his continuing
concerns about contribution limits, while
Chief Justice Roberts gave critical support to
the majority favoring campaign finance
reform. In many other areas. though,
including police searches and the death
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penalty, the law was what Justice Kennedy
said it was.
The court's current centrism is fragile.
Justice Stevens recently turned 86, and he or
another justice could leave in the next two
years, giving President Bush an opportunity
to fill the vacancy. If the court's strongly
conservative bloc gained a fifth vote.
American law would likely look very
different from the court's decisions this term
and from its rulings over the last 50 years on
issues like abortion, the environment and
civil rights.
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"Supreme Court Tilt to Right
Had Its Limits"
Christian Science Monitor
July 2, 2007
Warren Richey
The U.S. Supreme Court is a more
conservative place under Chief Justice John
Roberts and associate Justice Samuel Alito.
But the shift to the right is not as deep and
abrupt as it might have been had both of the
new justices fulfilled President Bush's wish
to populate the high court with jurists in the
mold of Antonin Scalia and Clarence
Thomas.
Instead, Chief Justice Roberts and Justice
Alito often staked out more moderate
positions than Justices Scalia and Thomas,
declining invitations from their conservative
brethren to vote to strike down liberal
precedents and declare broad new
conservative doctrines in some of the high-
profile cases decided in the just-ended 2006-
2007 term.
The session did produce a string of
conservative victories, including upholding
a national ban on so-called partial-birth
abortions, endorsing a narrow reading of a
key section of the McCain-Feingold
campaign-finance law, making it harder for
taxpayers to sue to enforce the separation of
church and state, and limiting the use of
race-based enrollment policies in public
schools.
But this was not Armageddon for liberal
precedents. At least not yet.
The court's move to the right can be partly
calibrated by the degree to which Justice
Alito is more conservative than the justice
he replaced last term, Sandra Day
O'Connor. The other factor is the swing
voter role of Justice Anthony Kennedy, who
is also to the right of Mrs. O'Connor's prior
positions on most key issues heard this term.
"There is not that much of a change because
the court had been divided 5-4 on many of
these same questions, says William Van
Alstyne of William and Mary Law School in
Williamsburg, Va. He calls it "a sea change
on the margin."
For conservatives, even marginal victories
are cause for celebration. They are the fruit
of an intense campaign to reshape the
judiciary launched a quarter-century ago
during the Reagan administration. For
liberals, it is a time of high anxiety and
despair over what an emboldened Roberts
court might produce in years to come.
But it's not all conservative applause and
liberal angst.
Kennedy As Swing Voter
The most significant development at the
court this term was the emergence of Justice
Kennedy, a conservative centrist swing
voter, as the center of power in the Roberts
court.
In the 2006-2007 term, the high court
handed down 24 opinions decided by 5-to-4
votes. Kennedy was on the winning side in
all 24 cases.
Scholars had to search back decades to find
a justice who might come close in achieving
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such a feat. Former Justice O'Connor, often
called the most powerful woman in America
when she was on the court, never did it.
Professor Van Alstyne says in his 45 years
of teaching constitutional law he has never
seen a justice who was "as crucial in so
many pivotal constitutional cases as has
been true of Justice Kennedy this term."
Thomas Goldstein, a Supreme Court
advocate and close court observer, offers a
similar assessment. "By and large it is
Justice Kennedy's court across an array of
questions," he told a recent gathering at the
Washington Legal Foundation. "He has such
complete control it is just extraordinary."
The essence of Kennedy's power is his
position at the center of the court. While
many legal disputes are disposed of with
unanimous or lopsided majorities, the most
contentious social issues tend to split the
nine justices 4-4 into liberal and
conservative wings. When this happens,
Kennedy often controls the outcome by
either writing the majority opinion or
authoring a concurring opinion that limits
the majority opinion.
As a result, it is Kennedy who decides not
only which way the law goes, but also how
far to the left or right it goes.
In the six biggest cases of the term, Kennedy
joined conservatives five times.
Judicial Restraint Evident
In the campaign-finance case, Federal
Election Commission v. fisconsin Right to
Life, Kennedy did not adopt his usual
centrist posture. Instead he joined Scalia and
Thomas in a call to overturn an important
section of the McCain-Feingold law.
Roberts and Alito were the ones who took
the more moderate road, saying the law was
unconstitutional "as applied" to the
Wisconsin group, rather than invalidating
that section of the law.
The action is an example of a doctrine of
judicial restraint often repeated by the chief
justice: "If it is not necessary to decide more
to dispose of a case, it is necessary not to
decide more."
Roberts's moderate posture prompted Scalia
to include a few choice barbs aimed at the
chief justice in a concurring opinion. Scalia
said Roberts's opinion effectively overruled
the law without saying so. "This faux
judicial restraint is judicial obfuscation,"
Scalia wrote, deploying a tone usually
reserved for dissenting opinions.
In a case involving taxpayer standing to sue
the White House for alleged violations of
separation of church and state, Scalia again
used a concurring opinion to fire off a
barrage of arrows aimed at Alito, Roberts,
and Kennedy. Scalia and Thomas favored
overruling a 1968 precedent, Flast v. Cohen,
that first permitted such taxpayer suits.
Instead, the three other justices favored an
approach that would carve out an exception
allowing taxpayers to sue only in response
to congressional action, but not in cases
solely involving the White House.
For Scalia, the outcome was untenable. The
only principled way to resolve the issue, he
wrote, was either to allow taxpayers to sue
in every instance or to overturn the
underlying precedent that awarded them the
right to sue in the first place. He accused the
three justices of hiding behind a "pretense of
minimalism."
"If this court is to decide cases by the rule of
law rather than a show of hands, we must
surrender to logic and choose sides," Scalia
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writes. "Either Flast v. Cohen should be
applied to all challenges. . . , or Flast should
be repudiated."
Scalia said he understood the impulse to
take a minimalist approach. "But laying just
claim to be honoring stare decisis [i.e.,
respect for precedent] requires more than
beating Flast to a pulp and then sending it
out to the lower courts weakened,
denigrated, more incomprehensible than
ever, and yet somehow technically alive."
He adds, "We had an opportunity today to
erase this blot on our jurisprudence, but
instead have simply smudged it."
A 'Kennedy Doctrine' for Schools
It is in the school race cases handed
Thursday that Kennedy's power
moderating force is on full display.
down
as a
Roberts wrote the majority decision
invalidating race-based public school
enrollment programs in Seattle and
Louisville, Ky. Both plans violate the
Constitution's equal-protection clause by
using race to decide which students would
attend the most popular schools, the court
ruled. The chief justice's opinion lays a legal
foundation to require officials to adopt a
color-blind approach in instances other than
attempts to remedy intentional
discrimination.
Had Kennedy provided an unreserved fifth
vote, the resulting decision would have
become a constitutional landmark, in effect
opening a new and controversial chapter in
race relations in the U.S.
But he stopped short of authorizing that
sweeping outcome. Instead, Kennedy
provided the crucial fifth vote to strike down
the two school programs but then wrote a
controlling concurrence that limits the
sweep of the Roberts plurality opinion.
The resulting Kennedy doctrine is that
school districts may use race to try to avoid
the racial isolation of minority students in
inner-city schools or to achieve a diverse
student body. But they can do so as a last
resort only after exhausting nonrace-based
means of achieving such goals.
Kennedy didn't always swing to the right in
major cases this term.
His most significant move to the left came in
a case involving an attempt to force the U.S.
Environmental Protection Agency to
regulate greenhouse gases to fight global
warming. It represents a victory for states
and environmentalists worried about the
impact of climate change, and makes it
easier to file future suits. But the holding
itself does not force the EPA to do anything
other than take a more rigorous look at the
problem and carefully justify any agency
inaction.
"The Impact of Fervent Dissent"
SCO TUSblog
June 28, 2007
Lyle Denniston
If Justice Anthony M. Kennedy is to hold
the one vote that counts as the Supreme
Court continues the decades-perhaps
centuries-of struggle with the role of race
in American law, and that seems beyond any
shred of doubt after Thursday's ruling in the
Seattle and Louisville cases, it is significant
that the liberal-to-moderate wing of the
Court will go on trying to coax or shame
him into remaining more or less in the
middle. The post on this blog by colleague
Tom Goldstein analyzing Kennedy's
concurrence Thursday makes clear why his
declarations are controlling, and why race is
still not a totally forbidden factor in public
education policymaking.
What Kennedy's opinion does not openly
admit, but what Kennedy's view of his role
has long made clear, is that he is deeply
sensitive to the way his work as a judge is
and will be perceived in history. This is not
true only in the work of the Court on race
questions, but on other social or cultural
issues as well.
While his own quite conservative instincts
must make it enormously tempting, now that
there are four rigorously conservative
colleagues, to join them routinely, the pull
of reputation and public image appears to
have told him to hesitate. He is even less
tempted, of course, to join routinely in the
more robust liberalism of his other four
colleagues. Both help explain why he is so
determinedly the middle Justice-a position
that is especially vivid at the conclusion of
the just-completed Term.
What was fully on display on Thursday,
amid a great deal of courtroom drama and
soaring rhetoric, was the contest that is
going on within the Court to influence
Kennedy and his vote. And, in that contest,
it can be argued that the Court's liberal
bloc-although it seems increasingly
isolated on some of the bigger decisions-is
having a substantial effect on reinforcing
Kennedy's instinct to keep staking out the
middle. The sharp critique of the dissents
plays into another facet of Kennedy's self-
perception.
He has a fundamental distaste for the heroic
and simplistic constitutional dogma-so
popular with two and perhaps more of his
conservative colleagues-that leaves
everyone to fend for themselves in decidedly
uneven political or legal combat. He
regularly seeks to put on display a large-
perhaps even a grand-perception of the law
that leads some unsympathetic observers to
regard him as a puffed-up thespian using the
Court and other public forums as a personal
stage. And one of his grandest perceptions is
that, if possible, the law should be made
inclusive and should remain sensitive in
human terms. (There is no doubt that
Kennedy would regard even his much-
criticized romanticizing of the relationship
of mother and unborn child in the abortion
ruling this Term as exhibiting just that kind
of sensitivity, just as he probably also saw
his often-maligned opinions in the past on
gay sexual relations and on prayers at school
graduations.)
The school cases are a clear example. His
vote was necessary to control the outcome,
and it very likely is true that the fervor of the
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dissent helped keep him away from a full
embrace of the principal opinion by the
Chief Justice. Indeed, while the dissents are
blistering in their denunciation of the
Roberts opinion, Kennedy's criticism of it
was likely to have a sharper sting. It
provided a separation from Roberts' more
sweeping declarations against racial
diversity as a valid public school goal, and
left those declarations without the profound
importance they would have had if they had
in fact represented the views of a Court.
"The plurality opinion," Kennedy said of
some of the Roberts approach, "is at least
open to the interpretation that the
Constitution requires school districts to
ignore the problem of de facto segregation
in schooling. I cannot endorse that
conclusion. To the extent the plurality
opinion suggests the Constitution mandates
that state and local school authorities must
accept the status quo of racial isolation in
schools, it is. in my view, profoundly
mistaken."
The plurality, he says at another point, -does
not acknowledge that the school districts
have identified a compelling interest here."
That, he said. was why he would not sign on
to the part of the principal opinion that ruled
out the pursuit of racial diversity as an
educational policy goal. "Diversity,
depending on its meaning and definition, is a
compelling educational goal a school district
may pursue," he went on. He even
persuaded a laundry list of "race-conscious"
policies that school districts could validly
adopt in that pursuit.
And Kennedy shunned entirely the
sentiment of conservative colleagues that the
Court should insist and that the Constitution
commands that public officials must be
"color-blind." He said: "In the real world, it
is regrettable to say, it cannot be a universal
constitutional principle."
To emphasize his departure from the
Roberts plurality on key points, Kennedy
took the highly unusual step of discussing
his concurrence in remarks on the bench.
While it has become more common for
dissenting Justices to recite from their
opinions, it hardly ever happens that a
concurring Justice does so.
Would Kennedy have worked so
energetically to carve out a separate position
had the colleagues in dissent moderated their
critique? Perhaps he would have. But it is at
least equally plausible that he did not wish
to be lumped together with the plurality as a
target of the dissents' most aggressive
thrusts of rhetoric. The dissent, it should be
noted, is only mildly critical of Kennedy's
specific suggestions of alternative race-
related policies that might be used, and that
made even more vivid the far stronger
language leveled at the Roberts coalition.
That the dissent was not lightly to be
dismissed is also evident in the efforts that
the Chief Justice made to answer it, and,
even more, the 36-page opinion Justice
Clarence Thomas wrote with the sole aim of
fending off the dissenters' arguments.
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"Justice Kennedy's Remarkable OT06"
SCOTUShlog
June 28, 2007
Jason Harrow
Justice Kennedy's just-completed October
Term 2006 will certainly go down as one of
the most "successful" in the Court's modem
history. Indeed, the statistics are remarkable:
Justice Kennedy was in the minority only
twice this entire Term, he wrote only one
dissenting opinion, and was a perfect
24-for-24 in 5-4 (or 5-3) cases. If the
numbers alone weren't enough evidence of
his tremendous influence, he certainly ended
the Term with a flourish: he authored two of
the Court's three 5-4 cases that were
announced today-siding with the liberals in
one and the conservatives in the other-and
also wrote the controlling concurrence in the
school assignment cases, which he
proceeded to read aloud from the bench. It
was a remarkable way to end a remarkable
Term.
Digging deep back into the archives, it's
difficult to find a Term where the decision
of a single justice so often determined the
direction of the Court. In the last 20 years,
under Chief Justices Rehnquist and Roberts,
such an achievement in unparalleled. The
closest analogy is Justice Kennedy's own
1993 Term: in that year, he dissented four
times, wrote one dissenting opinion, and was
in the majority in 12 of 13 5-4 decisions.
Not bad, but it doesn't measure up to what
he accomplished this Term.
Even Justice O'Connor, whom some used to
refer to as the "most powerful woman in the
world" due to her position in the center of
the Court for many years, never had a Term
like this. Her most successful Term was
OT03, when she was in the minority five
times and wrote two dissents; still, in that
Term, 4 of her 5 dissenting votes were cast
in 5-4 cases (there were 19 5-4's in OT03).
While it's true that she often wrote
"controlling concurrences" whose outsized
influence wouldn't necessarily be reflected
in the numbers but which did put a stamp on
the Court's jurisprudence, it's difficult to
make the case that she ever exerted as much
influence as Justice Kennedy seems to be
right now.
One must look way back in the Court's
history to find any single Term where one
Justice had comparable success. Justice
Kennedy's two dissenting votes tied Justice
Brennan's output in October Term 1968;
with a larger caseload back then, though,
Justice Brennan's feat that Term is arguably
more impressive. Still, one must go further
back to Justice Byron White's October Term
1964 to find a circumstance where a Justice
bested Kennedy and dissented only once
over the course of a full Term, with no
extenuating circumstances such as justice
turnover (which can lead to misleading
numbers).
The bottom line is that, by most measures,
Justice Kennedy's October Term 2006 has
been the most successful Term by a single
justice in roughly 40 years.
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5-4 Decisions in OT06 Sorted by
Membership in the Majority
Case Date Kennedy Alito Roberts Scalia Thomas Breyer Souter Ginsburg Stevens
Panetti 6/28 X X X X X
Leegin 6/28 X X X X X
Jeff. County 6/28 X X X X X
NAHB 6/25 X X X X X
Hein 6/25 X X X X X
FEC 6/25 X X X X X
Morse 6/25 X X X X X
Bowles 6/14 X X X X X
Uttecht 6/4 X X X X X
Ledbetter 5/29 X X X X X
Schriro 5/14 X X X X X
Smith 4/25 X X X X X
Brewer 4/25 X X X X X
Abdul-Kabir 4/25 X X X X X
James 4/18 X X X X X
Carhart 4/18 X X X X X
Zuni 4/17 X X X X X
Watters (5-3) 4/17 X X X X X
Mass v. EPA 4/2 X X X X X
Limtiaco 3/27 X X X X X
Marrama 2/21 X X X X x
Phillip Morris 2/20 X X X X X
Lawrence 2/20 X X X X X
Belmontes 11/13 X X X X X
TOTALS: 24 17 16 14 14 11 " 9 8 7
* Table adapted from "Visual Representation of 5-4 Decisions" by Ben Winograd, SCOTUSblog.
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"The High Court's Danish Prince: Whether to Be or Not to Be
a Liberal or Conservative Majority, Kennedy Decides"
ABA Journal
June, 2007
David G. Savage
On a mid-March night, the theater at the
Kennedy Center was packed for an unusual
drama. It was The Trial of Hamlet.
In the hands of Shakespeare, the prince was
an enigma, a portrait of agonized indecision.
But on this night, he stood trial in a legal
drama. Was he mad, or simply a murderer,
when he stabbed and killed Polonius?
Real lawyers-not actors-argued for the
prosecution and the defense, and two of the
nation's leading psychiatrists testified as
expert witnesses. A jury of 12 listened to the
evidence. Presiding as the trial judge was the
U.S. Supreme Court's own Hamlet-like
figure, Justice Anthony M. Kennedy.
A Shakespeare buff, Kennedy came up with
the idea for the staged trial. He said he was
fascinated by Hamlet because of the rich
complexity of the character-and, indeed,
because Hamlet is ultimately elusive.
An Audience Divided
On the nation's highest court, Kennedy
continues to prove elusive and hard to
categorize. Plenty of legal commentators
have voiced strong reactions to Kennedy's
recent decisions; but like Hamlet's mock
jury-which deadlocked on the issue of his
guilt or innocence-they seem hopelessly
divided on how to explain the decisions.
In April, for example, Kennedy cast the fifth
and deciding vote with the court's liberal
faction to reject President Bush's policy of
regulatory inaction on global warming.
Massachusetts v. Environmental Protection
Agency, No. 05-1120. The decision gave the
environmental movement its biggest victory
in years.
The key question for the justices was one of
standing: Could anyone show he had
suffered a particular and immediate injury
from global climate change that could be
remedied by a court? Chief Justice John G.
Roberts Jr. said the answer was no, and
therefore the suit should be dismissed.
But during the oral argument, Kennedy cited
an obscure precedent from 1907 that
appeared in none of the briefs. In Georgia v.
Tennessee Copper Co., 206 U.S. 230, the
state was objecting to air pollution wafting
over its territory, and Justice Oliver Wendell
Holmes agreed it could sue to protect its
independent and quasi-sovereign interest "in
all the earth and air within its domain."
In his majority opinion, Justice John Paul
Stevens adopted Kennedy's suggestion and
used Tennessee Copper as precedent to say
Massachusetts and the other states indeed
had standing to protect themselves from the
impact of global warming.
Stevens and Kennedy also teamed up in
April when the court turned down two cases
involving Guantanamo Bay inmates.
Although three justices voted to decide
whether courts should hear the inmates' case
for habeas corpus. the court couldn't garner
the fourth vote needed to grant cert.
Boumediene v. Bush, No. 06-1195, and Al
Odah v. United States, No. 06-1196.
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In a memo, Stevens and Kennedy said they
voted against hearing the appeals because
the lawyers for the Guantanamo detainees
failed to exhaust all the available remedies
in the law.
A few weeks later, Kennedy supplied a fifth
vote to reverse the death sentences for Texas
murderers in three separate cases. Abdul-
Kabir v. Quarterman, No. 05-11284; Brewer
v. Quarterman, No. 05-11287; and Smith v.
Texas, No. 05-11304. In all three, the
majority said the Texas law before 1991
prevented jurors from weighing the
mitigating evidence.
In between the rulings on the environment
and capital punishment, Kennedy spoke for
a 5-4 conservative majority in what many
saw as the most important anti-abortion
legal victory in the long struggle over the
procedure. Gonzales v. Carhart, No. 05-
0380, upheld Congress' ban on a disputed
mid-term abortion method that opponents
call "partial-birth abortion."
Kennedy's words may prove even more
significant over the long term: "The
government has a legitimate and substantial
interest in preserving and promoting fetal
life," he said, and the state "may use its
voice and its regulatory authority to show its
profound respect for the life within the
woman." His opinion clears the way for new
laws that seek to discourage pregnant
women from choosing abortion. Several
states are considering measures that would
require a doctor to show the patient an
ultrasound image of the fetus before
performing an abortion. Other proposals
would tell women about the pain a fetus
could feel at the middle months of a
pregnancy.
The reactions were many and sharply split.
"Kennedy is all but inexplicable." wrote
University of Oregon law professor Garrett
Epps and senior editor Dahlia Lithwick in
the Internet magazine Slate. He "puzzles
because he speaks in more than one voice."
They noted that in the past, he had written
glowingly about the "heart of liberty"
protected by the Constitution. He did so in
support of gay rights, Lawrence v. Texas,
539 U.S. 558 (2003), and the right to choose
abortion, Planned Parenthood of
Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505
U.S. 833 (1992). "How," they asked, "to
square the two men?"
By contrast, legal correspondent Jan
Crawford Greenburg of ABC News praised
Kennedy for consistency and courage. She
noted that Kennedy had dissented
vehemently seven years ago when the court
had struck down a similar Nebraska state
ban. Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914. "If I
say something, I want to stick with it," she
quoted him as saying.
Shift in Position
When President Reagan nominated Kennedy
to the court 20 years ago this fall, the new
justice came with a belief that abortion was
immoral and that Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113
(1973), had been wrongly decided.
But in the spring of 1992, when a five-
member majority was poised to overturn
Roe, Kennedy balked. He was reluctant to
repeal a long-standing constitutional right.
Instead, he joined an uneasy compromise
with Justices Sandra Day O'Connor and
David H. Souter that preserved the right to
choose abortion, while also giving states
more leeway to regulate the practice.
The difference between the Nebraska case
and this year's decision appears to be
O'Connor's retirement and President Bush's
choice of Samuel A. Alito Jr. to replace her.
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Kennedy believed O'Connor and Souter had
gone back on their deal in 2000 when they
voted to strike down the state's ban on so-
called partial-birth abortions. This
regulatory measure did not prevent women
from having abortions, and therefore it
should have been upheld under the joint
opinion from 1992, he said.
"Casey, in short, struck a balance," Kennedy
said in April. This includes "regulating the
medical profession in order to promote
respect for life, including life of the
unborn."
When Congress passed the Partial-Birth
Abortion Ban Act, it said the disputed
procedure was never "medically necessary"
to preserve the health of women. Three
lawsuits were filed to challenge the law, and
in all three, U.S. district judges held trials to
hear from medical experts.
Judge Richard Kopf in Nebraska held a two-
week trial and later wrote an opinion
stretching over 400 pages to summarize the
testimony. "In truth, 'partial-birth abortions'
are sometimes necessary to preserve the
health of a woman seeking an abortion....
When it is needed, the health of women
frequently hangs in balance," he concluded.
When a doctor faces an emergency with a
patient who is bleeding heavily. the "intact"
removal is by far the safest procedure, he
said. The two other judges came to
essentially the same conclusion.
But Kennedy's opinion dismissed the
findings and said there is "medical
uncertainty" over the need for the disputed
procedure. In dissent, Justice Ruth Bader
Ginsburg complained that the majority
"brushes under the rug the district courts'
well-supported findings."
A Door is Ajar
Still. Kennedy's opinion left the door open
for advocates to bring a targeted, as-applied
challenge to the ban. If doctors can show the
disputed procedure is needed to cope with "a
particular condition," they may be able to
obtain a limited exemption from it, he said.
When the court wraps up its term this
month, expect more of the same. Kennedy is
likely to hold the deciding vote when the
court is split along conservative-liberal lines.
Kennedy regularly votes in favor of free-
speech claims. This aligns him with the
conservative bloc on cases involving
campaign finance or abortion protests, but
with the liberal bloc in recent cases
involving indecency and Internet
pornography.
He has strongly opposed the government's
use of race in decision-making, which puts
him with the conservative wing in
opposition to affirmative-action policies.
Columbia University law professor Michael
Dorf, a former Kennedy clerk, has attributed
Kennedy's middle-of-the-road stance to his
background as a moderate California
Republican.
But sometimes the outcome is hard to
forecast. As the trial judge in Hamlet's case,
he waited on stage while the jurors
deliberated on the defendant's mental state.
They came back split 6-6, with no verdict.
Addressing the Hamlet who sat before him,
"Judge" Kennedy said he had no choice but
"to remand you to the pages of our literary
history.
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Anthony Kennedy seems most at home
when he is lecturing others about morality.
And now all of us have little choice but to
pay attention. With the retirement of Sandra
Day O'Connor, Kennedy is relishing his role
as the new swing justice on an evenly
divided court. As Kennedy goes, so goes
America: As he votes to uphold partial-birth
abortion laws or to strike down President
Bush's military tribunals, lo shall they be
upheld or struck down. Fawning lawyers
must write briefs to Kennedy alone, and
breathless commentators try to predict
which laws he will bless or reprove.
Many accounts of Kennedy cast him as an
indecisive justice-"Flipper," as the law
clerks unkindly put it in a Supreme Court
skit-who swings left or right in an anxious
effort to court the approval of Washington
elites: the Hamlet of the Supreme Court. But
these accounts misunderstand Kennedy and
his worldview. According to a recent study
by Lee Epstein of Northwestern University
and other political scientists, far from being
unpredictable, Kennedy is one of the most
consistent justices in recent history-
displaying far less leftward ideological drift
since the early '90s than O'Connor or even
former Chief Justice William Rehnquist.
From the beginning, Kennedy's
performance on the Court has been defined
not by indecision but by self-dramatizing
utopianism. He believes it is the role of the
Court in general and himself in particular to
align the messy reality of American life with
an inspiring and highly abstracted set of
ideals. He thinks that great judges, like great
literary figures, have both the power and the
duty to "impose order on a disordered
reality," as he told the Kennedy Center
audience. By forcing legislators to respect a
series of moralistic abstractions about
liberty, equality, and dignity, judges, he
believes, can create a national consensus
about American values that will usher in
what he calls "the golden age of peace."
This lofty vision has made Kennedy the
Court's most activist justice-that is, the
justice who votes to strike down more state
and federal laws combined than any of his
colleagues.
Kennedy often complains about the
"loneliness" of his position, which stems
from the fact that he has no reliable public
constituency: Both liberals and
conservatives tend to view him as a self-
aggrandizing turncoat. "Oh, I suppose
everyone would like it if everyone
applauded when he walked down the street,"
he said in an interview. "There is
loneliness."
But, when it comes time to hand down
decisions, Kennedy shows little ambivalence
about the centrality of his role in our
national drama. His opinions are full of
Manichean platitudes about liberty and
equality that acknowledge no uncertainty.
"Liberty finds no refuge in a jurisprudence
of doubt," he wrote in his decision in
Planned Parenthood v. Casey, the 1992
opinion upholding the core of Roe v. Wade.
"Preferment by race, when resorted to by the
State, can be the most divisive of all
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policies. containing within it the potential to
destroy confidence in the Constitution and in
the idea of equality," he intoned in a 2003
dissent from the Court's decision to uphold
affirmative action in law schools. Kennedy
does indeed agonize before reaching his
decisions, and he has dramatically switched
his vote in high-profile cases. Yet he seems
to agonize not because he is genuinely
ambivalent or humble but because he thinks
that agonizing is something a great judge
should do, to show that he takes seriously
the awesome magnitude of his task.
Is there a case to be made for Kennedy's
jurisprudence? The most convincing defense
is made by some Supreme Court advocates
who say he is willing to listen to the
arguments in important cases, engage with
them seriously, and make a decision based
on his sense of what justice and the law
require, rather than a partisan ideological
agenda. "As a litigant coming into the court,
the thing you want most of all is a justice
who has his or her mind open to argument,
persuasion, and reason," says my brother-in-
law Neal Katyal, who successfully argued
the Hamdan case last June, where Kennedy
sided with a five-four majority that struck
down Bush's military commissions. "You
want someone who struggles really hard,
who's kept awake at night, grappling with
what to do-a true judge. Justice Kennedy,
regardless of the issue in front of him, has
always been that kind of justice."
The claim that Kennedy is open-minded is
called into question, however, by Lee
Epstein's study, which concluded that, in all
doctrinal areas-especially affirmative
action-Kennedy has not changed much
since 1990. Of course, even if Kennedy isn't
open-minded, he might still be praised if he
were so ambivalent about judicial power that
he deferred to the other branches, although
he disagreed with their actions. But
agonizing can be a sign of many things-
modesty, arrogance, or insecurity. Truly
modest judges agonize because they are
humble about their own limitations and
genuinely ambivalent about second-guessing
legislatures. Judged by his willingness to
strike down federal and state laws, Kennedy
is the least modest justice on the Court.
That still leaves the core of a case for
Kennedy, which is that he is a moderate,
decent, fair-minded person rather than a
judicial ideologue-no small achievement in
a polarized age. And there's no question that
Kennedy deserves praise for deciding many
important cases on the basis of what he
thinks justice requires, rather than
consistently voting in ways that happen to
coincide with the platform of the Republican
Party. But the same could have been said for
Kennedy's predecessor as the median
justice, Sandra Day O'Connor. And, in other
respects, the contrast between Kennedy and
O'Connor is stark. To be sure, no one would
accuse O'Connor of being modest. She
viewed her role on the Court much as she
viewed her role in the Arizona legislature: to
split the difference between Republicans and
Democrats in order to express the view of
the American median voter. But O'Connor's
decisions, as Cass R. Sunstein has noted,
were minimalist-that is, they were narrow
and shallow. Because she offered few
principles to support her rulings, it was
difficult to extend them to future cases.
Moreover, her thinly reasoned opinions were
easier for citizens with differing political
commitments to accept.
By contrast, Kennedy instinctively prefers
opinions that are broad and deep. He
attempts to identify a sweeping principle of
justice and then tries to impose his
abstractions on society. Unlike a
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consistently principled judge, however,
Kennedy often balks at carrying his
principles to their logical conclusions. In
striking down sodomy laws in Lawrence v.
Texas, he promised that his reasoning
wouldn't lead to gay marriage. But he also
unnecessarily included his lucubrations
about the sweet mystery of life-then was
presumably shocked, shocked, when the
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, a
few months later, invoked the sweet-
mystery-of-life passage to strike down
restrictions on gay marriage. And, in Bush v.
Gore, he denied the obvious consequences
of his newly created right to equal treatment
for ballots, which was to call into question
the results in virtually any close election.
Kennedy is not a systematic thinker but a
utopian moralist; and, like many sweeping
visionaries, he is unwilling to accept the
radical implications of his own abstractions.
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